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Prof. Andrea Pető
The Future of V4:  
Where Have All the Progressive Ideas Gone 
and When Will They Come Back?
The “Visegrad Four” has recently become a problematic con-
cept, a regional cooperation, which is causing concern and 
raising eyebrows in Brussels. The well-performing students of 
the 1989 post-communist transition have become rebellious. 
How did a very innocent regional cooperation which was 
the product of the collapse of communism and momentary 
non-interest of the traditional geopolitical big players in the 
region, namely Russia and Germany, become so important? 
Visegrad has become famous for issues one 
does not wish to be famous for: the lack of 
consistent strategy and non-cooperation. 
This type of regional cooperation is very specific as it has 
a flexible system of fixed and written rules of cooperation, 
as well as rotating presidency and headquarters. The coop-
eration is fostered by the International Visegrad Fund and 
founded by government representatives. These cultural 
projects are expected to strengthen the cooperation. Even 
though there are only four member states, there is deep ani-
mosity among its members partly as a result of historical 
events that took place 70 or even 90 years ago. Still Viseg-
rad has recently emerged as a new geopolitical centre, partly 
because it is originally a cultural cooperation and the change 
of identity in terms of politics paved the way for a stronger 
and more effective cooperation.
Even though the analysis of these recent developments is 
rather shallow and follows forecastable patterns, this unex-
pected emergence of a new effective cooperation is a major 
paradigm change in Europe. The total population of these four 
countries is 64 million, greater than that of France and close 
to that of the UK, and amounts to the 22 nd largest economy 
in the world 1. Following the logic of market capitalism there 
1 Andrea Schmidt, Friends forever? The Role of the Visegrad Group and European 
Integration, Politics in Central Europe Vol. 12, Issue 3 2016, pp. 113–140.
is no need for another competitor in the already fragmented 
European market, but the in-between status of these in-be-
tween regions must be maintained economically (providing 
cheap labour), culturally (not investing in joint cultural pro-
jects) and politically (forming an alternative union: “Auster-
litz 3” by Austria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic). 
V4 countries argue that they have to find their own path 
to prosperity, and this should not be based on catching up 
with “the West” of Europe. This new geopolitical vision needs 
innovative analysis which moves beyond showcasing the 
V4 (or at least two of the four countries) as a bad example 
of democratic political practice and strategic thinking. How 
can countries whose economic growth is largely depend-
ent on EU structural funds be in a position to criticize the 
EU as a bureaucratic and non-democratic unit? In order to 
answer these questions memory politics and a new form of 
governance needs to be addressed before outlining some 
of the hurdles progressive forces have to overcome in the 
near future. 
History as Family Silverware
After the collapse of communism, the Visegrad Four was 
formed in a geopolitical vacuum aimed at promoting cer-
tain values according to the following founding statement: 
The diverse and rich cultures of these nations also embody 
the fundamental values of the achievements of European 
thought. The mutual spiritual, cultural and economic influ-
ences exerted over a long period of time, resulting from the 
fact of proximity, could support cooperation based on natural 
historical development 2.
Their joint aims in 1991 were: full restitution of state inde-
pendence, democracy and freedom; elimination of all existing 
social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian sys-
tem; construction of a parliamentary democracy; a modern 
State of Law; respect for human rights and freedoms; creation 
2 See: The Visegrad Group official website, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412-2
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of a modern free-market economy; and full participation in 
the European political and economic systems, as well as in 
the systems of security and legislation 3.
However, these aims have fundamentally changed over 
recent years which have also resulted in political changes. 
To understand these political changes, two concepts must 
be used: in-betweenness 4 and mnemonic security 5.
The past 25 years have shown that full integration of V4 
countries in European political and economic systems pro-
duces mixed results. The illusion concerning the integration 
of the in-between states, namely the merger of New Europe 
with “Old Europe” to form one Europe, quickly evaporated 
with the occurrence of the triple crises in 2008. The finan-
cial, refugee and security crises were game changers that 
questioned previous political alliances and strategies. There 
are substantial differences between the outlooks of the dif-
ferent political forces in the four countries as far as eco-
nomic issues are concerned, e.g. the future of the Eurozone 
in terms of the key political issue, namely their levels of crit-
icism as far as European integration is concerned. However, 
there is one issue they have in common that puts them on a 
level playing field: their consensual anti-migration position. 
Some politicians, including Prime Minister Orbán, are open, 
straightforward and combatant with regard to rejecting the 
migrant quota as a solution, while the Czech government 
quietly supports such a policy. With this open opposition to 
Brussels and the desire to return decision-making processes 
to the member states from European institutions, Visegrad 
countries have gained international attention. The interna-
tional attention politicians can capitalise in their local con-
texts and fights.
By now a substantial amount of literature has emerged 
discussing trends and developments concerning this new 
Visegrad reality. Most of the literature holds these states 
accountable for diversion from European liberal norms. Since 
2010 in Hungary, an easily detectable process has been con-
ducted as far as dismantling the democratic state is con-
cerned, Poland followed suit in 2016 after the PiS victory. The 
process is referred to as different names, namely cultural 
counter-revolution, mafia state, illiberal state, anti-demo-
cratic, populist and neoconservative, but the heart of the 
matter is the fundamental question of Central Europe con-
cerning whether or not this in-between region possesses 
specificities which would qualify it as a separate region. 
In order to understand the Visegrad 4 phenomenon the 
concept of in-betweenness needs to be applied. The feeling 
3 See: The Visegrad Group official website, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412-2
4 Szűcs Jenő, Parti, Júlianna, “The Three Historical Regions of Europe: An outline”, 
Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae Vol. 29 Issue 2 /4, 1983, 
pp. 131–184.
5 Maria Mälksoo, ‘Memory must be defended’: Beyond the politics of mnemonical 
security, Security Dialogue Vol. 46, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 221–237.
of being caught between two worlds and not supported by 
either is deeply rooted and dates back to the Ottoman, Rus-
sian or Soviet occupations through to the revolutions of 1956 
and up until the Prague Spring. The post-1989 period is also 
characterized by the feeling of being in-between which led 
to the formation of the Visegrad Four. 2008 was also a defin-
ing year in this regard as well.
The new world order works with what is referred to as 
“mnemonic security”, as well as the control of hegemonic 
forms of remembrance. The translation of history and its 
application and thus their identity-shaping effect, are becom-
ing a geopolitical factor. After 1989, fuelled by anti-commu-
nist sentiment within the former Eastern Bloc countries and 
the retributions that took place during the Soviet occupa-
tion, anti-communism became the foundation along with 
the revision of the progressive political tradition on national 
and international levels.
Before the enlargement of the EU in 2004 the new mem-
ber states, including the V4 countries together with the Baltic 
States, successfully lobbied for acceptance of the Memo-
rial Day for the Victims of Communism. This Memorial Day, 
which was expected to counterbalance the Holocaust Memo-
rial Day, created a built-in fracture in the memory culture 
of Europe. At the same time made the collaboration of the 
national elites with Nazi Germany and Soviet Union invisible. 
As the crimes committed by the communist countries had 
been invisible on the European level, now particularism was 
inserted in a system which was based on universalism. This 
memory frame of “repressive erasure” 6 is based on exclusion. 
This is the theoretical frame of different memory strategies 
based on national victimhood, which blames Nazi Germany 
and the Soviets for all the traumas of the 20th century. This 
memory frame also strengthens their cooperation based on 
mnemonic security and disregards the conflicts and rivalries 
which have been present there. This process reconceptual-
ises the original mission statement and makes it difficult 
for progressive political forces to articulate their demands 
in this hegemonic frame.
Since the time when Orbán’s government began to estab-
lish this new system, there have been many explanations that 
viewed Central Europe as the less-developed mirror image of 
Western Europe. Commentators believed that such a trend 
could never happen in “developed” democracies, but then 
came Brexit and the election victory of Trump, which sur-
prised those people who failed to see how divided the soci-
eties of these countries are. The crisis has shown us that 
Europe (and the US) has a dark history as well. A dark history 
that could be kept at bay through the interconnection of the 
human rights discourse and free-market capitalism – or so 
was thought after 1945. But after 2008 it became obvious 
6 Paul Connerton, Seven Types of Forgetting, Memory Studies Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2008, 
pp. 60–61.
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that colonialism, the holocaust, genocides, displacements 
and discrimination are as much parts of European history 
as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 
The mechanisms that were aimed at keeping these trends 
at bay are failing. Nowhere else is this failure more obvi-
ous than in the countries with decades of experience with 
lived communism.
Memory politics plays a key role in this process, which is 
visible in the many ways in which different states are silent 
with regard to the techniques of discrimination that are inher-
ent parts of their history in modernity 7. The fight for mne-
monic security, which in the case of the V4 countries means 
anti-communism, brought these countries together, but kept 
them distant from the progressive political tradition. In order 
to do challenge this, progressive forces need to handle the 
politics of emotions wisely and strategically while at the 
same time critically interrogate history of communism.
New Form of Governance: The Polypore State
This reconceptualization of progressive politics has not been 
easy over the past 25 years and it will not be any easier in the 
coming years. Duncan Light, whilst analyzing post-commu-
nist identities, pointed out that they are driven by the desire 
to construct new post-communist identities, characterized by 
a democratic, pluralist, capitalist and largely westward-look-
ing orientation 8. This desire, however, has changed due to the 
failure of neoliberalization of V4 countries. Evaluation of the 
communist period increasingly draws on pre-1945 concepts 
in V4 countries. In this context, it can be argued that com-
munist historiography was revisionist historiography and in 
post-communist Eastern Europe it is of the utmost political 
importance to analyse how this history-writing works as its 
anti-modernist variant is gaining momentum in the form of 
anti-modernist revisionism in history writing especially in the 
case of the history of emancipatory politics 9. The memories 
of communism and the more than hundred years old left-
ist tradition have been omitted, forgotten and denied.
The re-emergence of anti-modernism as a 
reaction to neoliberalism in post-communist 
Eastern Europe also appropriated history in 
order to achieve its aims, namely to create 
a viable, liveable and desirable alternative. 
7 Andrea Pető, Revisionist histories, ‘future memories’: far-right memorialization 
practices in Hungary, European Politics and Society Vol. 1, 2017, pp. 41–51.
8 Duncan Light, Gazing on Communism: Heritage Tourism and Post-Communist 
Identities in Germany, Hungary and Romania, Tourism Geographies Vol. 2, Issue 2, 
2000 pp. 157–176.
9 Andrea Pető, Revisionist histories, ‘future memories’: far-right memorialization 
practices in Hungary, European Politics and Society Vol. 1, 2017, pp. 41–51.
The fact that the current governments of Hungary and 
Poland are in the process of building a different kind of state 
inside the EU points to the failure of norm building. This is 
the reason why, in cooperation with Weronika Grzebalska, 
the term “polypore state” was created based on our work 
on Hungary and Poland as far as the description of illiberal 
trends in the EU is concerned which in fact is not only con-
fined to these countries even though they produce the best 
examples within the EU. This newly created polypore-like 
formation resides at places where the structure of the tree – 
or in our case the state – is injured; and from there it starts 
constructing its own, parallel structure 10. It is of utmost 
political importance to understand this form of state and 
start thinking about different new forms of resistance as old 
forms do not work in this new context.
This parallel state structure functions in three ways: by 
mirroring the function of the state, feeding a discourse 
(through the use of other’s resources and ideas), and chang-
ing the values that govern society. An example of mirroring 
is women’s organisations whose number has significantly 
grown over the last few years. This growth is in part due to 
the creation of a parallel NGO-system consisting of conserv-
ative women’s organizations and GONGOs (government-or-
ganized non-governmental organizations) that follow all 
kinds of small agendas, such as the labour rights of women 
or the reintegration of young mothers into the labour force; 
but there are even organizations that combat domestic vio-
lence. It is important to mention the latter as the ratifica-
tion of the Istanbul Convention will bring in new funds to 
Hungary, and the government plans to channel this money 
into the GONGO-system, where loyalty to the state is of 
upmost importance.
The second function of the polypore state is most visible 
in the current security discourse: all the talk about “George 
Soros”, the “migrants” and “gender” is about increasing the 
feeling of insecurity so that the state can step in and posi-
tion itself as the saviour of the people.
The third function is the so-called “familiarity” – in this 
system women do not exist anymore, they become part of 
the family, and even the state is seen as a family; it func-
tions in exactly the same way as a big family. Historical revi-
sionism plays a similarly prominent role in terms of global 
transformation as does the transposition of emphasis from 
women to families – e.g. in some countries, such as Hun-
gary and Poland, the CEDAW reports of the United Nations 
mention families instead of women; and women only appear 
as parts of the family. This again is an example of how the 
10 Andrea Pető, Hungary’s Illiberal Polypore State, European Politics and Society 
Newsletter 21, Winter 2017, pp. 18–21; Andrea Pető, Weronika Grzebalska, How 
Hungary and Poland have silenced women and stifled human rights, The 
Huffington Post, 16.10.2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-
global/how-hungary-and-poland-ha_b_12486148.html 
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polypore state supersedes the existing institutional mech-
anisms and uses them to achieve its own goals.
The polypore state actually appropriates issues, e.g. the 
fight against international capitalism, protecting small-
home owners against banks, etc., making it very challeng-
ing for progressive forces to readopt that agenda and be vocal 
about these issues.
Challenging the Polypore State
Any kind of resistance to the polypore state should emerge 
from a space. In this section a possible space is discussed, 
namely the NGOs, and a possible issue, gender equality 
to be precise, considered to illustrate the possible forms 
of resistance.
In post-democracy 11 new political programmes emerg-
ing from the re-articulation of the relationship between the 
state and citizens are constructing new spaces 12. These new 
spaces are placing democratic actors in an opposing binary 
position to the establishment, which has a major impact 
on their performance. Any kind of alternative or resistance 
is difficult to maintain as the polypore state questions this 
binary constructing its own NGO sphere, namely the GON-
GOs, which represent the appropriated agenda of the secu-
lar, human rights-based organizations on both the national 
and international levels. The polypore states have started 
to establish a pseudo-NGO movement that enjoys mass 
support by means of state funding, with livelihoods pro-
vided by opaque interest groups and with populism-based 
party communication.
The NGO sector in the countries of the Visegrad Four, 
which had previously acted as a watchdog and a voice for 
human rights values in accordance with the principles of lib-
eral democracy, has been fundamentally transformed and 
now struggles to respond effectively to the government’s 
fundamental structural positions which have broad support 
in society. Due to a lack of funding and being criminalized in 
the framework of securitisation of the polypore state what 
remained for them is the international arena which predom-
inantly consists of different institutions in Brussels. While 
seemingly active on the international level these NGOs are 
imprisoned in the national context, as they appear to be the 
most powerful lobby groups if supported by the special cir-
cumstances of their national context. A structural critique of 
neoliberal globalization has had little effect on the domestic 
political agenda. The strengthening of racist and national-
ist movements offering anti-modernism as a real alternative 
to neoliberal democracy and the market economy, coupled 
with the failure of attempts to adapt the Third-Way social 
11 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge-Malden 2004.
12 Andrea Pető, Zoltán Vasali, Political Space: Half Empty? The Case of Hungary, 
SPACE-Socio-Political Alternatives in Central Europe. eds. Katarzyna Sobolewska-
Myślik, Dominika Kasparowicz. Warsaw, ELIP11SA, 2014, pp. 60–75.
democratic model, led to marginalization of democratic val-
ues. Therefore, the donor-dependent NGO sphere, which is 
also stigmatized by the security discourse as a foreign agent 
even though most of its issues are now represented by GON-
GOs, is an unlikely space from where resistance will emerge. 
It would be a mistake to question people’s identification 
with, and support for, such NGOs or to explain the process 
in terms of lavish state funding alone. The issues they repre-
sent are often material issues, but the language they use is 
different to that of the progressive movement. Nowhere else 
is this more obvious than in the case of women’s issues. 
The outlook for women’s organisations does not look 
any more promising either. Social movements have devel-
oped in a specific manner. As has been stated on numerous 
occasions, the country’s NGO sector is weak and vulnerable 
in terms of both public support and funding 13. As far as the 
leftist and liberal women’s movements are concerned, the 
question does not only address the manner in which they 
can represent international norms (such as gender equality), 
but also how they evaluate and react to the fact that their 
political influence has not grown in the post-1989 period, 
even though gender inequality has increased to unprece-
dented levels in all fields. 
As far as gender analysis is concerned, the concept of 
“New Woman” was labelled by Rita Felski in her work The 
Gender of Modernity as rendering women “prisoners of pro-
gress” (Felski, 1995 pp. 11–33). In the rhetoric of the progressive 
women’s movements, women represent the new beginning, 
whereby the future is conceived as a normative project that 
develops linearly. The historical metanarrative about the past 
of women is hierarchical and exclusive, while aiming to forge 
a counter-identity. The discourse of the women’s movement 
is strategic and emotionally charged. Its language creates 
collective subjectivity along with shared rituals, symbols of 
meanings and stories. The main intervention should be to 
create a re-enchanted language 14.
Gender equality started with work: once women stepped 
out of their role of unpaid caretakers, they started demand-
ing payment for the work they were doing equal to that of 
men. Now, by focusing on the tendencies, it will be seen that 
robots take on exactly the same jobs that women do. While 
at the same time there is also a trend for romanticising the 
care work done by women through the ideology of female 
difference – these two together will deter women from enter-
ing the labour market resulting in women losing the mate-
rial basis of the emancipatory ideology.
13 Ferenc Miszlivetz, A demokrácia és a civil társadalom átalakítása a globális térben 
[Democracy and the Transformation of Civil Society in the Global Space], Civil 
Szemle Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 63–82, http://www.civilszemle.hu/downloads/
cikkek/2012/30szam_2012_1_Miszlivetz_063-082.pdf
14 Andrea Pető, Gender equality as re-enchantment: political mobilisation in the 
times of “neo-patriarchal neo-liberalism” and possibilities of bipartisan dialogue, 
Woman Up 2: A Transatlantic Gender Dialogue. : A Transatlantic Gender Dialogue 
eds. Judit Tánczos, Maari Pőim. Brussels, FEPS, 2015, pp. 138–145.
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In the meantime, a fundamentalist ideology supports the 
polypore state, according to which the task of women – who 
are considered as unequal to men – is to stay at home and 
care for the family. Only afterwards might she be allowed to 
work part-time. An important political fight evolves around 
the question of whether it is possible to quantify care. Pos-
sible questions concerning the so-called care crisis which are 
of particular importance to our future include who is going 
to give birth, bring up the children, and care for the sick and 
elderly. The “women’s policies” of the national right-wing 
political parties all focus on the normative cult of moth-
erhood and familialism. In their political language, these 
parties refer to “family policy” rather than “women’s poli-
tics”, whereby the social role of women is normative moth-
erhood. The liberal-leftist critique of the normative cult of 
motherhood places the emphasis on women’s individual 
human rights and the right to choose motherhood. This 
option includes the right to reject maternity – which in con-
servative discourse is regarded as “national” sabotage 15.
The conservative women’s movement, with its focus on 
the primacy of the family and its denial of freedom of choice 
and structural discrimination, has found a rival in the field of 
women’s politics. Far-right fundamentalist gender politics, 
also based on the politics of care and placing the family at 
the centre, seeks in the long run to absorb the political space 
for conservative women’s politics, while uniting all these 
political forces under the rhetoric of hostility to communist 
oppression 16. The rhetoric of progress, namely the concept 
of a “New Woman”, is being appropriated by anti-modern-
ist political forces. This rhetoric of victorious neoconserv-
ative politics after 1989 has left the emancipatory leftists 
in a defensive position, as their rhetoric is a defensive and 
negative one. Having failed to critique the basis of neolib-
eral politics, it remains the prisoner of progress and helpless 
to familialism supported by welfare benefits.
The dualism of the neoliberal neopatriarchy 
and the polypore state – which both 
suggest cruel solutions to today’s problems 
– could be resolved through the formation 
of new coalitions and the eradication of 
false dichotomies.
15 Andrea Pető, Anti-Modernist Political Thoughts on Motherhood in Europe in a 
Historical Perspective, Reframing Demographic Change in Europe. Perspectives 
on Gender and Welfare State Transformations, eds. Heike Kahlert and Waltraud 
Ernst. Berlin: Focus Gender. Band 11. LIT Verlag, 2010, pp. 189–201.
16 Weronika Grzebalska, Eszter Kováts, Andrea Pető, Gender as symbolic glue: how 
‘gender’ became an umbrella term for the rejection of the (neo)liberal order, 
Political Critique, 13.01.2017; Eszter Kováts, Maari Pőim (eds.), Gender as Symbolic 
Glue: The Position and Role of Conservative and Far Right Parties in the Anti-
Gender Mobilizations in Europe, Brussels, FEPS, FES, 2015.
 There are many points where conversations could be had 
and a shared language formed, but at the moment this does 
not seem likely, as everyone who joins the discussion does 
so as if it concerned antagonistic questions; in other words, 
they all want to convince others that they possess the only 
right answer. Gender equality is a good entry point as one 
of the long lasting legacies of the statist feminist period 
is the consensual value of gender equality. Independently 
from the fact that in habitual practices that is not neces-
sarily present, that can be a good starting point for rethink-
ing progressive politics.
Locality is usually not conceptualized as a major space 
for rethinking politics, even though it is the basis of rep-
resentational politics. Progressive intellectuals, like Cas 
Mudde among others, are still prisoners of the aufklarist /
enlightenment paradigm which states that intellectuals 
should “spill down” their ideas to the society and develop 
class consciousness 17. Mudde is right that political parties 
are not up to the task of creating a new identity politics, as 
they are products and representatives of an old-identity poli-
tics regime. However, the resistance to the polypore state can 
only come from localized contexts, namely localized issues 
by local actors which are framed globally. The issue of cor-
ruption (constitutive part of the polypore state) or gender 
equality, even though it is a structural and global phenom-
enon, can mobilize resistance only around a local issue. The 
future will tell us whether reinventing locality in the age of 
identity politics in the V4 context, together with new move-
ments outside the context of NGOs, can change political par-
ties into institutions of representation.•
17 Cas Mudde, Nothing left? In search of (a new) social democracy, 21.11.2013, http://
www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/nothing-left-in-
search-of-new-social-democracy (accessed on 4.01.2014)
